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Abstract
This paper examines the optimal (￿rst-best) ￿scal policy in a stochastic, in￿nite-horizon
representative agent model that exhibits consumption-enhanced as well as wealth-enhanced
social status in the household utility. We show that the optimal labor tax rate is a positive
constant that is used to correct negative consumption externalities. The optimal capital tax
rate is also positive in order to overturn agents￿status-seeking capital over-accumulation.
Moreover, we ￿nd that in contrast to a conventional automatic stabilizer, the optimal
capital tax moves in the opposite direction with shocks to ￿rms￿production technology.
This result turns out to be qualitatively consistent with the discernible empirical evidence
that many countries have implemented procyclical ￿scal policies.
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There is now an extensive literature that examines the macroeconomic e⁄ects of agents￿quest
for social status (or concern for their relative position in the society) within neoclassical mod-
els of capital accumulation, economic growth, and asset pricing. Speci￿cally, an individual
household￿ s status-motivated preferences are postulated to depend on its own consumption or
wealth relative to a reference standard that is typically de￿ned as the economy￿ s aggregate
level of consumption or capital stock. With the noted exception of Tournemanie and Tsoukis
(2008), previous research in this literature has investigated the case with either consumption-
enhanced or wealth-enhanced social comparisons separately.1 By contrast, we examine the
￿rst-best ￿scal policy in a stochastic, in￿nite-horizon representative agent model that exhibits
both (consumption and wealth) indicators of social status in the household utility. To our
knowledge, this is the ￿rst work that explores such an important research topic not only for
its theoretical insights, but also for its wide-ranging implications for the design and implemen-
tation of optimal tax policies.
This paper incorporates agents￿status-seeking motives in consumption as well as in wealth
into a standard, technology shock-driven one-sector real business cycle model with perfectly
competitive ￿rms. In order to highlight the distinct tax-policy e⁄ects of consumption-based
versus wealth-based social comparisons, we consider a ￿log-log￿utility speci￿cation that ex-
hibits additive separability between relative consumption and relative wealth (physical capi-
tal). The presence of these two external e⁄ects call for government intervention in that com-
petitive equilibrium does not yield Pareto-optimal resource allocations. On the other hand,
the separable preference formulation allows us to identify model features and parameters that
govern the optimal ￿scal policy in a rather transparent manner.
In our model economy, the equilibrium level of consumption is higher than that at the
Pareto optimum because of agents￿jealous desire to keep up with the Joneses. To correct this
particular market failure, the ￿rst-best tax rate on labor income turns out to be a positive
1Earlier work on consumption-based social comparisons includes Abel (1990), Gal￿ (1994), Rauscher (1997),
Futagami and Shibata (1998), Fisher and Hof (2000), Ljungqvist and Ulhig (2000), Alonso-Carrera et al. (2004),
Guo (2005), Liu and Turnovsky (2005), and Tsoukis (2007), among many others. In terms of wealth-based
social comparisons, see Zou (1994, 1995, 1998), Bakshi and Chen (1996), Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 2001a,
2001b), Chang, Hsieh and Lai (2000), Chang and Tsai (2003), Clemens (2004), Chang, Tsai and Lai (2004),
Fisher and Hof (2005), and Chen and Guo (2008), among many others.
1constant that is equal to the strength of consumption externality. Since it is the economy￿ s
contemporaneous aggregate consumption that enters the household utility, the representative
agent￿ s intratemporal trade-o⁄ between consumption and hours worked will be a⁄ected. It
follows that the benevolent social planner can choose the optimal labor tax that is independent
of productivity disturbances period by period.
We ￿nd that the ￿rst-best tax rate on capital income is also positive such that the Pareto-
optimal level of investment can be achieved by eliminating equilibrium over-accumulation of
capital caused by agents￿wealth-based status-seeking motive. In addition, the optimal capital
tax rate does not depend on the parameter that captures the social comparisons in consump-
tion. Intuitively, capital taxation a⁄ects the representative household￿ s intertemporal choices
of consumption goods at di⁄erent time periods, whereas the current level of aggregate con-
sumption enters its utility function as a negative externality. As a result, consumption spillover
can be corrected by taxing agents￿labor income without any intertemporal considerations. On
the contrary, a state-contingent capital tax is needed to correct the wealth-induced preference
externality.
Finally and perhaps most surprisingly, in sharp contrast to the traditional Keynesian view
of automatic stabilizers that emphasizes their role in mitigating business cycle ￿ uctuations, the
￿rst-best capital tax in our model economy moves in the opposite direction with disturbances
to ￿rms￿production technology. Speci￿cally, it is adopted to counter-balance movements in
output and consumption such that the household￿ s marginal utility bene￿t generated from
its wealth-enhanced social status remains una⁄ected with respect to technology shocks. This
result turns out to be qualitatively consistent with the existing empirical evidence that many
countries, particularly within the developing world, have implemented procyclical ￿scal policies
(Gavin et al., 1996; Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Kaminsky et al., 2004; and Talvi and Vegh, 2005).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the
conditions that characterize a competitive equilibrium and the Pareto optimum. Section 3
derives and discusses the ￿rst-best ￿scal policy. Section 4 concludes.
22 The Model
Our model economy consists of households, ￿rms and the government. Households￿preferences
are de￿ned over their own consumption, capital stock and leisure, as well as the current levels
of aggregate consumption and capital in the economy. In order to examine the distinct tax-
policy e⁄ects of consumption-enhanced versus wealth-enhanced social status, we consider a
household utility function that exhibits additive separability between relative consumption
and relative wealth (physical capital). On the production side, a homogeneous ￿nal good
(GDP) is produced in a perfectly competitive environment. The government balances its
budget each period and chooses the ￿rst-best ￿scal policy.
2.1 Firms
There is a continuum of identical competitive ￿rms in the economy, with the total number




t ; 0 < ￿ < 1; (1)
where kt and ht are capital and labor inputs, respectively, and zt represents an aggregate
technology shock.
Under the assumption that factor markets are perfectly competitive, the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t max-









where rt is the capital rental rate and wt is the real wage.
2.2 Households
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical, in￿nitely-lived households. Each
household is endowed with one unit of time together with k0 > 0 units of physical capital, and

























0 < ￿ < 1; 0 ￿ ￿ < 1; ￿ > 0; A > 0; ￿ ￿ 0;
where ct is the individual household￿ s consumption, and Ct is the contemporaneous level of
aggregate consumption that is taken as given by the representative agent. When ￿ > 0, the
marginal utility of an individual household￿ s own consumption increases with the aggregate
consumption, hence the household utility exhibits the ￿keeping up with the Joneses￿feature.
This speci￿cation also implies jealousy (Dupor and Liu, 2003) or a negative consumption
externality because each household does not take into account the external e⁄ect that its
consumption reduces the utility of everyone else￿ s. Moreover, the strength of consumption-
based comparisons is bounded above by the restriction ￿ < 1 such that strict concavity with
respect to private consumption is guaranteed in a symmetric equilibrium.
In addition to consumption and leisure (= 1 ￿ ht), the representative agent derives utilities
from the wealth-based social status represented by its capital ownership kt relative to the
economy-wide level of capital stock Kt. Therefore, the relative wealth kt
Kt is postulated to





the parameter ￿ measures the degree for ￿the spirit of capitalism￿(Zou, 1994, 1995, 1998). As
for consumption, the status-seeking motive in wealth generates a negative capital externality
in the household utility. Finally, ￿ represents the discount factor, A is a preference parameter,
and ￿ governs the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply. Notice that standard
preferences correspond to the case of ￿ = ￿ = 0 whereby households derive utilities only from
their own consumption and leisure.
The budget constraint faced by the representative household is given by
ct + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt = (1 ￿ ￿ht)wtht + (1 ￿ ￿kt)rtkt + ￿kt￿kt + Tt; (5)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes the depreciation rate of physical capital. Households derive their
income from supplying labor and capital services to the ￿rms at rates wt and rt, and pay taxes
on labor and capital income at rates ￿ht and ￿kt, respectively. Two additional sources for the
4household￿ s income are the capital depreciation allowance ￿kt￿kt that is built into the U.S. tax
code, and a lump-sum transfer Tt.
2.3 Government
The government sets ￿ht, ￿kt and Tt, subject to the following constraint that balances its
budget each period:
Tt = ￿htwtht + ￿kt(rt ￿ ￿)kt: (6)
Since we focus on the ￿rst-best ￿scal policy in this paper, government spending on goods and
services does not enter our analysis. Combining (2), (3), (5) and (6) yields the aggregate
resource constraint for the economy
ct + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt = yt: (7)
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, each household maximizes (4) subject to its budget constraint
(5), while taking factor prices, tax rates and the economy￿ s aggregate consumption and capital


















￿t￿tkt+1 = 0; (11)
where ￿t denotes the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the representative agent￿ s budget
constraint (5), and (9) equates the slope of the household￿ s indi⁄erence curve to the after-tax
wage rate. Equation (10) shows that the standard intertemporal consumption Euler equation
5is modi￿ed to re￿ ect the expected marginal utility bene￿t from agents￿status-seeking capital





, and (11) is the transversality condition.
2.5 Pareto Optimum
At the Pareto optimum, the social planner internalizes the external e⁄ects of aggregate con-
sumption and aggregate capital by setting ct = Ct and kt = Kt in the utility function (4),
subject to the production technology (1) and the economy￿ s aggregate resource constraint (7).























￿t￿tkt+1 = 0; (15)
where ￿t denotes the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the aggregate resource constraint
(7), and (13) equates the slope of the planner￿ s indi⁄erence curve to the marginal product of
labor, (14) is the consumption Euler equation, and (15) is the transversality condition.2
3 First-Best Fiscal Policy
There are two kinds of market imperfections in our model economy. First, when ￿ > 0,
the negative consumption externality generates a higher level of consumption in equilibrium
compared to that at the Pareto optimum. Second, when ￿ > 0 that captures the presence of
wealth-based social comparisons, the Pareto-optimal level of physical capital is lower than that
in a competitive equilibrium. Therefore, these environments create an incentive for government
2Since the production function (1), and the utility function (4) with ct = Ct and kt = Kt both are strictly
concave, equations (12)-(15) are the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for characterizing the unique Pareto
optimal allocations.
6intervention to address the sources of market failures in that competitive equilibrium does not
yield an e¢ cient (￿rst-best) allocation of resources.
Proposition 1. The ￿rst-best ￿scal policy that implements the social planner￿ s allocations
as a decentralized equilibrium is
￿￿







t = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)yt + ￿ct; (18)
for all t, where rt is given by (2) and yt is given by (1) .
Proof. We note that equations (8)-(11) are the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a
competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, conditions (12)-(15) are
necessary and su¢ cient for the Pareto optimum. To derive the ￿rst-best ￿scal policy, we
need to show that when policy rules (16) and (17) are implemented, the resulting equilibrium
allocations, characterized by (8)-(11), satisfy the Pareto optimality conditions as in (12)-(15).
By comparing (8) and (12), we ￿nd that the marginal utility of consumption in equilibrium
is proportional to its e¢ cient counterpart where
￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿t: (19)
Substituting this condition, together with the equilibrium wage rate (3) and the proposed
￿￿
ht = ￿ into (9) shows that the social planner￿ s ￿rst-order condition for hours worked (13) is
satis￿ed. Similarly, substituting (8) and (19), together with the period-t+1 equilibrium capital
rental rate rt+1 = ￿
yt+1
kt+1 and the proposed ￿￿
kt+1 =
￿ct+1
(rt+1￿￿)kt+1 into (10) proves that the social
planner￿ s intertemporal consumption Euler equation (14) is satis￿ed. Finally, the optimal
lump-sum transfer T￿
t is obtained by substituting (3), (16) and (17) into the government
budget constraint (6). ￿
Recall that agents￿status measured by the social comparisons in consumption and wealth
both generate negative externalities in the representative household￿ s preferences. It follows
7that like a Pigouvian tax, taxing status-seeking activities will raise economic welfare in our
model economy. Speci￿cally, equation (16) shows that, as in Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), the







.3 The intuition for this ￿nding is straightforward. The ￿rst-order condition
for labor supply governs the intratemporal choices of consumption and leisure, along with the
contemporaneous nature of consumption spillover imply that the benevolent social planner can
choose the optimal labor tax period by period. As a result, eliminating negative consumption
externalities calls for taxing labor income at the rate ￿ each period (￿￿
ht = ￿), which in turn
induces agents to face the correct trade-o⁄ between their decisions in consumption versus
leisure (or labor hours).
On the other hand, since the net rate of return from investment rt ￿ ￿ is positive so that
households have an incentive to invest, the optimal tax on capital income under the ￿rst-best
policy, given by (17), is positive (￿￿
kt > 0). That is, ￿￿
kt is set to achieve the Pareto-optimal
level of investment by removing agents￿status-seeking motive which generates capital over-
accumulation in equilibrium. Notice that in the absence of wealth-based comparisons (￿ = 0),
the optimal capital tax rate becomes zero (￿￿
kt = 0) as there is no intertemporal interrelations
among macroeconomic aggregates that the social planner needs to address. Moreover, the
￿rst-best capital tax rate does not depend on the consumption externality that is governed
by the parameter ￿. Intuitively, capital taxation a⁄ects the intertemporal trade-o⁄ between
consumption goods at di⁄erent dates, whereas the current level of aggregate consumption
enters the household utility. Therefore, consumption spillover can be corrected by the optimal
labor tax, as in (16), without any intertemporal considerations. By contrast, state-contingent
taxation on capital income is needed to correct the wealth-induced preference externality.
Proposition 2. The ￿rst-best tax rate on capital income moves in the opposite direction




Proof. We ￿rst rewrite the ￿rst-best capital tax rate by substituting (2) into (17) to obtain
3Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) obtains the same result on ￿
￿
ht under a slightly di⁄erent preference speci￿cation.
In particular, the household utility depends on the di⁄erence between an individual￿ s own consumption and a
fraction of the economy￿ s current level of aggregate consumption. By contrast, we adopt the ￿ratio￿formulation,














and note that @kt
@zt = 0 because the value of kt is pre-determined in period t￿1. It follows that










































￿i2 < 0: (21)
A positive productivity disturbance shifts out the labor demand curve, which causes the real





both to rise. This in turn raises the total output, whose in-













@zt > 0.4 ￿
In sharp contrast to traditional Keynesian demand-management policies that are designed
to mitigate business cycle ￿ uctuations, the ￿rst-best capital tax ￿￿
kt in our model economy does
not operate like an automatic stabilizer. Instead, it is adopted to counter-balance movements
in output and consumption caused by shocks to the ￿rm￿ s production function in combina-
tion with households￿status-seeking economic activities. To understand this (perhaps quite)
surprising result, we rearrange the analytical expression of ￿￿
















kt is the capital rental rate given by (2), and ￿
kt is the marginal utility bene￿t derived
from agents￿status-motivated capital accumulation. Since kt is a pre-determined variable, ￿
kt













(1￿￿)(1￿￿). Since A > 0, ￿ ￿ 0, 0 < ￿ < 1 and ￿ ￿ 0, the preceding
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ct represents the government￿ s capital tax revenue, valued
using the household￿ s marginal utility of consumption, given by 1
ct. A positive innovation
to the labor productivity raises the economy￿ s tax base because of higher hours worked and
output. Moreover, higher labor hours increase the household￿ s projected income stream,
thereby raising its ability to consume. Given the economy￿ s aggregate resource constraint (7),




@zt > 0. This, together with @kt
@zt = 0, implies that ￿￿
kt has to fall in order to maintain the
equality of (22). As a result, the ￿rst-best ￿scal policy consists of a procyclical capital tax




As it turns out, the above result of ￿scal pro-cyclicality is qualitatively consistent with sub-
stantial econometric evidence. For example, Gavin et al. (1996) and Gavin and Perotti (1997)
show that ￿scal policies are often procyclical in Latin American countries: higher government
consumption and lower taxes during expansions, whereas the opposite holds true during re-
cessions. Talvi and Vegh (2005) report that the phenomenon of ￿scal pro-cyclicality is not
limited to Latin America. Based on a sample of 56 countries over the 1970 ￿ 1994 period,
these authors ￿nd strong and robust empirical support for procyclical ￿scal policies in non-G7
industrial and many developing countries. Kaminsky et al. (2004) also show that numerous
(from a large sample of 104) countries exhibit ￿scal pro-cyclicality between 1960 and 2003.
Overall, our analysis provides a theoretical explanation for the procyclical ￿scal policies that
are observed in the actual data, particularly within developing countries.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that when consumption-enhanced as well as wealth-enhanced social status
enter separably into the representative household￿ s utility function, there is a clear division
of the ￿rst-best ￿scal policy with regard to correcting the economy￿ s two market failures.
Speci￿cally, a time-invariant and positive tax rate on labor income is needed to eliminate
negative externalities that arise from the contemporaneous level of aggregate consumption. In
addition, to overturn agents￿status-seeking capital over-accumulation in equilibrium, a state-
contingent and positive tax rate on capital income is called for. Finally and perhaps quite
surprisingly, in contrast to a conventional automatic stabilizer, the optimal capital tax moves
10in the opposite direction to technology shocks for a rather unorthodox reason ￿it is used to
counter-balance ￿ uctuations in output and consumption such that the wealth-status-motivated
marginal utility bene￿t remains una⁄ected by disturbances to ￿rms￿production technology.
This result turns to be qualitatively consistent with the discernible empirical evidence that
many countries have adopted procyclical ￿scal policies.
This paper can be extended in several directions. For example, we can consider a more
generalized preference formulation that exhibits non-separability in relative consumption and
relative wealth. This extension will allow us to examine the robustness of our results by analyz-
ing the interrelations between intratemporal and intertemporal distortions from consumption-
based versus wealth-based social comparisons. Moreover, it would be worthwhile to incorporate
other kinds of market imperfections that have been studied in the optimal taxation literature,
such as incomplete markets (Aiyagari, 1995), untaxed factors of production (Correia, 1996),
lack of commitment (Benhabib and Rustichini, 1997), and imperfectly competitive ￿rms (Guo,
2005), among many others. We plan to pursue these research projects in the near future.
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